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ABSTRACT
Information and the technological advancements for which mankind develops
with regards to its storage has increased tremendously over the past few decades.
As the total amount of data stored rapidly increases in conjunction with the
amount of widely available computer-driven devices being used, solutions are
being developed to better harness this data. These types of advancements are
continually assisting investigators and computer forensic examiners. One such
application which houses copious amounts of fruitful data is the Google Desktop
Search program. Coupled with tested and verified techniques, examiners can
exploit the power of this application to cater to their investigative needs. This
paper includes a real world case example of these techniques and its subsequent
outcome.
Keywords: Google Desktop, Forensics, Case Study, Case Example, Artifacts,
Criminal Defense, Investigation
1. CASE BACKGROUND
We must be forward in asserting that there will be no names or case specific
biographical information used in these writings. The foundation of this paper is an
educational exploration in the field of Computer Forensics and is not intended to
focus on the case itself, rather the investigative methods and techniques employed
therein.
Sometime in 2009, the Defendant (D) John Doe was alleged to have molested his
stepdaughter. Soon thereafter, Navy investigators seized a desktop computer from
the D’s home. The computer was imaged and processed by Government agents,
and the derivative evidence was turned over to the local Police Department where
a Child Abuse Detective took over and housed the evidence.
Initial struggles with received evidence:
1) The evidence provided to Digital Forensics, Inc. (DFI) was not an
image file of the D's computer, rather a full disk restoration of that
image file. The D's original hard disk drive (HDD) was 320 gigabytes
and had been forensically restored to a 500 gigabyte drive.
2) This is typically frowned upon; however, it is perfectly admissible if
the evidence can be verified and its integrity maintained.
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3) Amid concerns of evidentiary veracity, DFI obtained the image log(s)
from the government agents who facilitated the acquisition of the D's
HDD. DFI verified the total sector count (example: 625,156,024), then
hashed the sector range 0 - 625,156,023, amounting to the total
mentioned previously. This was performed on a write-blocking device;
the resultant hash matched the value indicated in the government's
imaging log.
2. EARLY EXAM ASSESSMENT
Being primarily an FTK and EnCase firm, the team mounted, indexed and
processed the image we had made of the 500GB restore in FTK and setup a
baseline case in EnCase v 6.18 as well. We worked to establish a set of keywords
to use in the examination which would ultimately be the basis for subsequent
analytics. Some of the terms included: “Preteen”, “Lolita” and several other more
explicit terms omitted from this paper. Alongside this, a basic battery of
operations was performed in EnCase to gather a time line of events. The team was
able to discern a few things: 1) That the D had first and last used the computer on
dates consistent with the seizure and imaging of his computer; 2) At least two
cleaning (evidence removal) tools had been downloaded and executed on the 27th
of September, 2009; 3) And finally, through corroborating evidence, learned that
the computer was in a shared location in the D's house, making access not
exclusive to the D.
3. EXAM DETAILS
The keyword searches executed across the FTK dtSearch index yielded a large
amount of responsive hits for the aforementioned terms. A large majority of these
terms resolved back to a file called dbeam. This file is found among several other
ambient files in the following directory: “\Partition Root\Users\John
Doe\AppData\Local\Google\Google Desktop\GUID #”. The search hits were
responsive on one of the primary files (dbeam) used by the Google Desktop
Search (GDS) application. For those unfamiliar with its functionality, GDS
intelligently logs snapshots of end-user activity including: web browsing, file
accessing, e-mail (if enabled) and chat sessions. Papers on GDS and its relevance
to evidence gathering have been drafted, and are referenced in the sources cited
portion of this paper. GDS is home to a wealth of evidentiary items normally
unseen by a surface level examination. The dbeam file is text-based, proprietary
in nature – as are most GDS files – and employs obscure coding and even
compression. Table 1 provides a list of application specific information:
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Table 1. Application-specific information. Some of this information was
derived from the Google Desktop Wiki entry
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Google_Desktop).
Developer(s)
Most Recent Stable
Release
OS Compatibility
License Type
Site
Registry Key

Data Directory
(7/Vista)
All ambient files in
Data Directory

Google (NasdaqGS: GOOG)
5.9.1005.12335
Cross-Platform
Proprietary
Desktop.google.com
\HKEY_USERS\SID#\Software\Google\Google Desktop
Herein lays the string values “data_dir”and “user_sid” among
other values of evidentiary relevance.
\root\users\John Doe\AppData\Local\Google\Google
Desktop\{GUID}
Refer to Heins (2008).
*Google has added additional files since 2008, but their specific
function is unknown.

“The files dbdam, dbdao, dbeam, and dbeao are text-based, and appear to show
the process of [GoogleDesktopCrawl.exe], and represent all files indexed and
websites visited” (Turnbull, 2006). Figure 1 provides a visual listing of the GDS
data directory.

Figure 1. Visual listing of the GDS data directory.
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Figure 2 displays the values from the Google Desktop registry key listed in Table
1. In particular, the “data_dir” string value is highlighted.
Items such as URL entries and others are stored as plain text inside of the dbeam
file, thus the responsive search hits in the dtSearch FTK index. The text hits inside
of FTK were virtually meaningless. However, with the advent of GDS native
review, the true evidence was brought to life.
Based on a small sampling of papers regarding this application, we followed one
approach to get the information we needed and then took a more conventional
approach to verify our results. The first thing we did was to copy out and verify
the contents of the D's GDS database folder (the GUID# folder mentioned
previously). Once these files were copied out (amounting to roughly 4 gigabytes),
they were transferred to a forensically sterile laptop (the laptop was deemed
sterile as it was never connected to a network or used for work other than this
examination). The tricky part of this method is getting a clean install of GDS on a
workstation and having it ingest and parse the D's database, not one created for
the workstation itself. Please refer to the papers referenced at the end of these
writings for greater detail on this process, noting that some were drafted as long
ago as 2008 and are no longer valid/applicable in some regards. One thing to keep
in mind is the GUID # is unique to each installation/machine for GDS. For
example: the GUID folder # created for John Doe is 27f70b7d, however; this is
specific only to that user's profile and was created only during that installation. If
the user were to uninstall and reinstall GDS, that value would change;
furthermore, that GUID folder # will fail to recognize on a separate workstation
(DFI tested and verified this). To overcome this, you need to copy the contents
from within the /GUID # folder into the /GUID # folder created on your analysis
workstation. The Google Desktop Search installation process creates a GUID
value within the registry that is linked to the application, and as such, will not talk
to directory entries with a different value. Changing the {GUID} value at the end
of the “data_dir” string in the registry entry may or may not suffice for this task,
but we urge those of you with spare time to explore this option.

We were eventually able to gain read-only access to the Defendant’s
GDS contents on our review laptop. Read-only (R-O) access was
possible as the file's attributes were flagged R-O just after launching the
GDS application; this process allowed for a perceived-infallible review.
We could not validate that hash values for the GDS files were not
changing along the way during the process; we believe this goal is
impossible to achieve. The courts must be lenient when accepting this
evidence as it is one of two methods which allow examiners to make
sense of the proprietary GDS data.
14
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Figure 2. Google Desktop registry keys.
GDS was provided ample time to parse the D's database and bring it to life; the
subsequent searches performed had alarming results to say the least. We reexecuted the same terms responsive in the dtSearch FTK index to see samples of
the activity in the D's GDS database. We encountered hundreds of web history
entries of activity related to child pornography (CP), CP named videos, images
being opened and web searches being performed for explicit phrases conducive to
CP in general. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the GDS application is that it
is not subject to simple purging. The dbeam file's records are only removed when
the file reaches a capped size limit (typically 4 gigabytes). On top of that, it
performs a first-in, first-out (FIFO) operation whereby the earliest records/entries
are removed when it's time for new data. This information means that we were
only privy to records as far back as sometime in early 2008. Google Desktop
Search is dynamically updated via HTTP, so versioning is difficult to ascertain.
May it also be known that – by default – GDS does not index hidden files or
folders.
We retract what was stated in the previous paragraph – the single most interesting
facet of the GDS application review is that the date/time stamps are available for
the activity. Without this aspect, the evidence is somewhat unremarkable. We
were able to see a clear time line of CP activity and the dates/times on which it
took place. It is extremely important to note and verify the suspect system’s time
settings. This practice is always critical when facilitating a forensic exam, but
with regards to GDS, the time stamps displayed within the database are shown
with the analysis workstation’s GMT offset in mind. For example, if a record for a
visited/cached website is displayed as 09/14/2009, 10:59 pm, setting the
workstation housing the suspect DB to UTC (Casablanca) will display the time as
09/15/2009, 5:59 pm. In our specific case, the suspect machine was configured at
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GMT - 8:00 (Pacific), as was our analysis workstation. What we ended up seeing
after many hours of diligent research was a window of usage; the CP activity was
taking place entirely within a time frame of 09/13/2009 to 09/21/2009 – a period
of 8 days. We were not seeing a single fragment of CP activity in the GDS
database on either side of those dates, nor outside of GDS itself. Figure 3 shows a
snapshot example of cached web browsing activity. Case specific information has
been redacted from the screenshot in this figure. Please note the “snapshot”
appearance of the browsing activity and the search for the term “preteen” in the
text box.

Figure 3. Cached Web brower activity.
According to Turnbull (2006), “Google Desktop also caches all HTML Internet
pages visited, including pages retrieved via an SSL connection (this can be
removed via a configuration option, but is activated by default), which may
provide quick access to identifying information not otherwise available through
such a medium, such as bank and account details, web-based email settings, and
online purchase history” (p. 8). Extensive follow up queries against the GDS
database allowed for us to find ambient activity records. One such item was a bus
ticket purchased towards the end of business on 09/21/2009. We were able to
ascertain that the ticket was purchased by the D, but that the ticketed passenger
was the D's Father. Other queries were carefully crafted from this intelligence and
applied to the GDS database to find corroborating data.
The Defendant was an avid computer game player, and as such had a few
habitually played games installed on his computer. We were able to determine –
looking at the chat and game logs – the frequency and time frame of game play
for certain titles. We were able to pinpoint a break in game play activity which
directly coincided with the eight day window wherein CP activity took place (13th
– 21st). Could it be reasonably doubted that the D was not using the computer
during the CP time window laid out by the GDS research? Prior to this type of
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investigative follow up work, the government's evidence simply showed
responsiveness to certain explicit terms as well as a few questionable images that
existed in the form of thumbnails. These thumbnails were carved and did not
possess any valid metadata.
It is always important to validate findings with other tool(s) in an effort to confirm
the integrity of what you are assessing. This was the first case for DFI wherein
GDS was the key evidentiary element, however, that being said, we always
employ the use of many processes and tools to lay a foundation of certainty when
evidence is on the line. In this case, we used FTK, EnCase, and the GDS
application to paint a picture of computer usage for the D. To further validate the
GDS work, we used a Virtual Machine (VM) solution to look at the D's computer
in its original, natural state. The VM process involves taking a forensic image and
creating a read-only environment which mirrors the user's operating system. From
an analysis workstation we were able to go through the D's computer as if we
were actually using the original. This is very advantageous as a courtroom
demonstrative and secondary evidence verification method. The work described
above with the GDS review process was also facilitated in the VM environment
and the same results were confirmed across the board. The VM solution used was
Virtual Forensic Computing (VFC 2.10.10.4). This licensed application allows
examiners to not only boot a VM environment, but has intelligent modules to
freeze the VM process, bypass Windows password(s) and resume the VM so that
a boot sequence may be successful. In our case example, we had to bypass the D’s
Windows profile password as it was not provided.
Other intelligence gathered included a web history record (in GDS) showing
access to a service called JPAY (on 09/21/2009). JPAY, an inmate financial
services system, is a Department of Corrections (DOC) program which allows
users to send money and packages to inmates incarcerated in the correctional
system. Through corroborating data, we were able to determine that the D's
Father had made a payment to his other son whom was in jail for separate crime.
This information came from the personal appointment book of the D's Father.
Shortly after the JPAY web activity took place, we saw more explicit activity
resume. This case boasts an additional wealth of corroborative evidence than
could be shared in this paper. However, we hope it is a valuable lesson to all CF
examiners that it is always worth the extra time to dig further in search of truth.
After much deliberation among the jurors, a guilty verdict was delivered the
following week. The case is currently awaiting sentencing and the appeal process
update will be provided at a later date.
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